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THE BATTLE OF GLORIETA PASS:
ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE CIVIL WAR

DAVID WESTPHALL

THE

CIVIL WAR in the Territory of New Mexico culminated in
the battle of Glorieta Pass, which took place near Santa Fe on
March 28, 1862. The battle, although almost forgotten today, is
important because it deprived the Confederacy of four potentia]
advantages which could have altered the course of the War between the States.
A Confederate victory at Glorieta Pass would have meant not
only the addition of New Mexico to the Confederacy, but would
also have opened the way for the Confederate conquest of the
American West, including Colorado, Utah, Nevada, and California. Arizona was already under Confederate control. The addition
of this territory would have more than doubled the size of the Confederacy, and assured it sufficient area for national settlement,
economic development, and the expansion and strengthening of
slavery. Moreover, the resulting prestige could have brought the
European diplomatic recognition which the South coveted. During
this early part of the war France and England were even more
sympathetic toward the South than they were when Lee made his
bid at Gettysburg for, among other things, diplomatic recognition.
A victory at Glorieta Pass would have opened the way to the
gold fields of Colorado and California. Because of the Northern
blockade, the South was not able to use its chief resource, cotton,
to finance the war as planned. Nevertheless the Confederacy put
forth stiff resistance. If the South had had funds to match its sterling military talent, who knows what the result would have been?
If a Confederate victory at Glorieta Pass had opened the road to
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the western gold fields, the Union would have been deprived of
one of its most important sources of war-making ability. With the
Confederacy controlling twelve hundred miles of Pacific shoreline, the Union blockade which strangled the South would have
become much more difficult to maintain and much less effective. 1
The South could have exported its cotton again, and imported arms
and other necessary supplies. The South would have had a chance
to develop an effective navy, instead of a smattering of raiders
launched from British and French ports.
Of the four potential advantages to the South, the last two are
the most important. Had the Confederacy been able to seize the
gold fields and the coast, the Bow of gold, which Lincoln called
"the life-blood of our financial credit," 2 would have been diverted
from Washington to Richmond, and "the oceans would have
swarmed with Alabamas." 3
New Mexico was the geographic key to the surrounding areas,
and to the eventual conquest of California. The invasion was assigned to Texas, and by October 3 I, I 86 I, about three thousand
frontiersmen and Indian fighters had assembled at San Antonio
for the march to Fort Bliss, near El Paso, and the advance up the
Rio Grande into New Mexico. 4
The South had several reasons for believing the Texans would
be successful in New Mexico. The commander of the invasion
force, Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, was a graduate of West
Point with a distinguished record including service in the Seminole and Mexican Wars. 5 Equally important, he had recently
served with the Union Army in New Mexico and was familiar
with the territory. The troops sent into New Mexico were frontiersmen schooled in Indian warfare and inured to hardship. Some of
them were veterans of the Mexican War. Many of them brought
their own horses and weapons for the campaign, and all knew how
to ride and shoot.
Southerners believed that the Apache and Navajo would keep
Federal troops busy and divert them from the campaign. There were
never enough troops in New Mexico to control the Indians, and
as the Civil War approached the Indians seemed to sense that the
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whites were quarreling among themselves, and their raids became
even more numerous than before.
The Confederacy believed that there were many Southern sympathizers in New Mexico. The Territory's delegate to Congress,
Miguel A. Otero, expressed a pro-Southern viewpoint which became even more pronounced after his marriage to a lady from South
Carolina. New Mexico's governor and territorial secretary were
from North Carolina, and the Territory's military commander was
from Mississippi. Several prominent New Mexico newspapers disseminated a pro-Southern point of view. New Mexico had commercial ties with pro~slavery Missouri, and most of the traders who
came into New Mexico over the Santa Fe Trail were from the
South. In I 859, after Southern friends had made the suggestion to
Governor Otero, 6 New Mexico had enacted a stringent slave code.
The Confederates believed that they had support in other areas
of the Southwest. A convention at Tucson had already declared for
the South. Northern sympathizers in Arizona had Bed into Mexico,
and Arizona had become a Confederate territory. In California
Federal troops were used more than once to break up secessionist
rallies, and it was estimated that as many as thirty thousand men
would have taken up arms for the South at the approach of a strong
Confederate force. 7 In the newly formed territory of Colorado the
situation was similar. On October 26, I 86 I, while the Texans were
marching from San Antonio, Governor William Gilpin wrote a
friend: 'The malignant secession element of this Territory has
numbered 7,5oo. It has been ably and secretly organized from
November last, and requires extreme and extraordinary measures
to meet and control its onslaught. . . . To prepare for what may
be accomplished by them is my duty." 8 In Utah the United States
government was persecuting the Mormons for their practice of
polygamy, and the South believed that the Mormons would welcome a chance to aid the enemies of their tormentors .
. For these reasons, when the Texans advanced into New Mexico
from Fort Bliss their prospects for success seemed good. The Territory's southern governor and military commander had been replaced, but this did little to dim Confederate hopes. On February
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21, 1862, the Confederate Army of New Mexico met a Federal
force of about 1 ,2oo regulars and 2,6oo native militia and volunteers at Valverde in southern New Mexico. The Federal troops
were led by the Territory's new military commander, Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, brother-in-law of the Confederate commander,
General Sibley.
The engagement began when the Confederate advance guard
tried to cross the Valverde ford from the east to the west bank of
the Rio Grande, but was driven back by a Federal detachment.
Soon both armies were concentrated at the ford and a full-scale
battle was in progress. Under cover of their superior artillery, which
drove the Confederate guns from the field, the Federal infantry
crossed the river to the east bank; then the guns came across and
took up a position in the Federal lines. Confederate dragoons and
lancers9 charged several times, but under the deadly Federal fire
the screams of wounded horses mingled with the groans of their
riders. Colonel Canby ordered a charge to complete what appeared
to be a Federal victory when about a thousand Texans on foot
climbed from an old channel of the Rio Grande where they had
taken refuge from the Yankee artillery. Armed with rifles, pistols,
shotguns, and bowie knives, their determination reinforced by
desperate thirst, they hurled themselves at the key Union battery.
Cannister and grape ripped gaps in their onrushing ranks, but
the Texans pressed forward to the battery and overwhelmed it in
a savage hand-to-hand struggle. "Never," reported a Confederate
officer, "were double-barrelled shotguns . . . used with better
effect." 10 The gunners fought back bravely with pistols and ramming staffs, but most of them were killed. The Confederates now
turned the captured guns on the supporting infantry who, terrorstricken by the rebel yells and the slaughter of the gunners, Hed
into the Rio Grande "more like a herd of frightened mustangs than
like men." 11 Many of them were killed as they tried to wade across,
and a correspondent for the Houston Tri-Weekly Telegraph described the Rio Grande as "literally dyed with blood." 12 Although
he may have exaggerated, in relation to the numbers involved, the
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hard-fought Confederate victory at Valverde was possibly the most
lethal battle of the Civil War. 13
The Confederate invasion of New Mexico had started off successfully, but for several reasons it was destined to fail. The Confederate dependence on the Indians as inadvertent allies worked
in reverse. According to the Confederate plan, the invading ,army
would be self-sustaining, without a supply line reaching back into
Texas, and despite a large supply train the Texans expected to rely
heavily on New Mexico sheep and cattle for food. But with an invasion imminent, Canby had decided to let the civilians fend for
themselves, and as a consequence the Indians had ravaged the
countryside. After the campaign Sibley wrote: "The indespensable
element, food, cannot be relied on. During the last year, and pending recent operations, hundreds of thousands of sheep have been
driven off by the Navajo lndians." 14
Because of lack of discipline the Texans alienated the native
population. Sibley's official policy was to treat the natives with restraint and to pay them for any provisions confiscated. Sibley's
troops were hard fighters, but even after rigorous training at San
Antonio, they lacked the discipline of the professionals under Sibley's command. They let their horses graze in the "Mexican" wheat
fields, saying that they just happened to "get loose." No amount of
extra duty could cure them of this. On nights of bitter cold many
of the soldiers forced their way into the New Mexicans' adobe
homes and crowded the families into one room or evicted them altogether. The Texans simply took whatever they wanted. In answer to Federal charges, a Confederate soldier insisted in later years
that no woman was "appropriated" without her consent. 15 In any
case, an indifferent native population16 soon became intensely hostile toward the invaders. The arrogance of the Texans, who had
nothing but contempt for "Mexicans," renewed an enmity which
had its roots in the Texas War for Independence in I 83 6 and in
an abortive Texas invasion of New Mexico in I 84 I to enforce boundary claims. The Texans soon learned that with only twenty-two
Negro slaves in the territorl 7 the New Mexicans had little in-
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terest in slavery, and that any strong pro-Southern feeling in the
territory was the result of an Anglo-Saxon minority vocal out of all
proportion to its strength. The slave code of I 859 had resulted
from the efforts of this minority and a few politically ambitious
New Mexicans like Otero. When the crisis carne, Otero, who believed that the war would end in several independent republics in
the West, urged his fellow New Mexicans to remain neutral, then
join the strongest after the war. 18 Most New Mexicans, who
wanted nothing better than to be left in peace, concurred, but the
behavior of the Texans stirred them from their apathy. After the
Texans had been in New Mexico a short time, any herds and Hocks
that had not been run off by Indians were driven elsewhere by
their owners when the invaders approached.
The vigorous action of Colorado's Governor Gilpin not only
effectively suppressed Southern sympathizers in that Territory,
but a force of 9 I 6 volunteers, mostly Denver miners, was raised and
sent into New Mexico. In California too, secessionists were controlled, and troops were raised and shipped around Cape Horn to
join the Federal armies in the east. In addition, although they arrived too late to do any fighting, a force of some I .400 California
Volunteers made an extraordinary march across the Colorado and
Gila deserts with the intention of saving New Mexico for the
Union. 19 However it was the First Colorado Regiment of Volun-

WESTPHALL: GLORIETA PASS

143

teers commanded by Colonel John P. Slough, 20 a Denver lawyer,
.which proved decisive in stopping the Confederate invasion of
New Mexico. In order to arm and equip the regiment, and also to
keep weapons out of the hands of potential rebels, Governor Gilpin purchased all the available firearms in the Territory and paid
for them with drafts on the Federal treasury. He also jailed all
known Southern sympathizers. Perhaps more than any other single
person, Gilpin was responsible for the Confederate defeat in New
Mexico. An officer of the First Colorado said Gilpin's actions
"proved to be the salvation of this country [Colorado] from the
hands of the rebels." 21 Ironically, Gilpin was recalled to Washington and dismissed for issuing unauthorized drafts.
A final reason for the Confederate failure was the battle of
Glorieta Pass itself. After the Confederate victory at Valverde the
Federal army took refuge at Fort Craig near the battlefield. The
Confederates wanted the supplies at Fort Craig, but did not have
heavy enough artillery to attack the fort's earthworks. By going
north they at least cut the fort's supply line, so they continued up
the Rio Grande, hoping to find supplies at Albuquerque. There the
small garrison had burned what they could not carry away and retreated to Santa Fe. The Conferates followed them to Santa Fe,
still hoping to find supplies. The Santa Fe garrison also destroyed
everything they were unable to ta~e with them, and retreated to
Fort Union, the last Federal stronghold in New Mexico. The Confederates entered the capital unopposed and prepared to march on
Fort Union, about fifty miles northeast of Santa Fe, which they believed was only weakly defended.
Meanwhile, the First Colorado had hurried into New Mexico by
forced marches, making sixty-seven miles in one twenty-four hour
period. After resting at Fort Union, Colonel Slough added 336
regulars from the fort to his 9!6 Colorado Volunteers, and advanced on Santa Fe. At Bernal Springs he dispatched Major John
M. Chivington22 with 2 I o cavalry and I 8o infantry to proceed
ahead of the main body and raid Santa Fe. Chivington was to
march as far as he could that day, remain encamped the next day,
then the next night continue to Santa Fe and surprise what Slough
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apparently believed was a small Confederate force occupying the
town. About twelve o'clock that night Chivington' s force reached
Kozlowski's ranch near the old Pecos ruins, where they learned
from the owner that Confederate scouts were about five miles ahead
at Pigeon's ranch 23 near the eastern entrance of Glorieta Pass.
While the rest of the men encamped for the night Lieutenant Nelson and twenty cavalrymen were sent ahead with orders to bring
back a prisoner. They returned about dawn with four well-armed
and mounted Texans who, in the darkness, had mistaken the patrol
for their own comrades and were easily captured. Chivington
learned, or deduced, from the prisoners that a sizeable body of
Texans was in the area. He discarded his original plan and decided
to march ahead for a daylight battle. After breakfast the Federal
force set out along the Santa Fe Trail with the infantry in front,
the cavalry in the rear, and a wave of scouts screening the advance.
While the Federals were marching from Bernal Springs to Kozlowski's ranch a Confederate advance guard of about three hundred men and two artillery pieces set out from Santa Fe. They
encamped that night at Johnson's ranch near the mouth of Apache
Canyon. The canyon forms the western end of Glorieta Pass,
which is about seven miles long, narrow at both ends, and a quarter of a mile wide in the middle. The next afternoon the Confederates also took the Santa Fe Trail, completely unaware as they
made their way through Apache Canyon that a Federal force was
moving toward them. They were commanded by Major Charles L.
Pyron, who had been one of the leaders of the final charge at Valverde and who was about to meet in Major Chivington an officer
of equal dash and presence of mind.
Chivington's force continued past Pigeon's ranch and entered
Glorieta Pass. About two o'clock the Federal scouts turned a short
bend in the canyon and found the Confederate scouts resting in a
thicket of trees and bushes. The Confederates were taken completely by surprise, and a lieutenant and thirty men surrendered
without firing a shot. When the main body received word of what
had happened they knew the enemy was just ahead. Chivington
ordered his men to close ranks and advance at the double. The
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Coloradoans ran forward eagerly, as if they were hurrying to a
Denver saloon instead of to mortal combat. As they advanced they
stripped for action by throwing aside blankets, canteens, and knapsacks. After about three-quarters of a mile they turned a bend and
saw the Confederates some four hundred yards ahead. At the same
time the rebels spied their adversaries. Major Pyron immediately
deployed his men as skirmishers across the canyon floor. The howitzers were unlimbered, the Lone Star banner was unfurled, and the
howitzers opened fire. When the shells screamed over them, the
Federal ranks were thrown into confusion; horses bucked and shied
and the men milled about uncertainly. Chivington quickly divided
the infantry into two groups and sent them clambering up either
side of the canyon with instructions to get on the Confederate
flanks. The cavalry, consisting of I 32 regulars from Fort Union
and a company of 88 Colorado Volunteers, was ordered to a protected position in the rear. Captain Howland of the regulars was
instructed to wait until the Confederates showed signs of retreating, then to charge with the cavalry.
As the Colorado infantry climbed, they were protected by the
rocky, wooded t~rrain which tended to nullify the howitzer fire.
Eventually, as Chivington had foreseen, the Confederates were
forced to withdraw. They limbered up their guns and retreated
about a mile and a half to a ditch about fifteen feet wide and as
many deep which ran across the canyon. Howland failed to seize
this opportune moment to attack. Pyron ordered the guns set up
behind the ditch and the bridge which spanned it destroyed. This
time the Texans were positioned across the canyon from summit
to summit. Chivington surveyed the situation and decided to repeat his previous tactics. Because the Confederate front was now
wider, the regular cavalry was sent forward on foot to fight with the
infantry. The volunteer cavalry under Captain Cook was held in
reserve with orders to charge when the Confederates should again
appear to give way. After about an hour the Confederates were
enfiladed on their left flank, and once more they limbered up their
guns to retreat. Chivington shouted at the cavalry. Even before
the words had left his mouth Cook had drawn his saber, spurred
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his horse, and ordered his men to charge. As the Coloradoans galloped forward, many of them, in their first experience under fire,
thought the musket balls whizzing over their heads were cannon
balls. Captain Cook was one of the first hit when one of the standard loads of the day, an ounce ball and three buckshot, lodged in
his thigh. He managed to stay on his horse until it stumbled and
fell on him, adding a sprained ankle to his shattered leg. His company thundered past him wielding their pistols and sabers. Only
one horse failed to clear the fifteen-foot arroyo. Half the cavalry,
under Lieutenant Nelson, pursued the coveted guns, but the artillery horses were too swift and soon outdistanced them. The two
rear sections, under Lieutenant Marshall, attacked and scattered
the Confederate reserve. The infantry closed in on the Hanks and
completed the rout. 24 Various sources report Confederate losses of
from 16 to 32 killed, and 30 to 40 wounded. All sources agree,
however, that at least 70 Texans were taken prisoner. Reports agree
that Federal losses were 5 killed, I 4 wounded, and 3 missing.
Night had fallen and the Federals now withdrew to Pigeon's
ranch where they buried their dead and cared for their wounded.
Although jubilant over their victory, now that the excitement of
battle had worn off, they were also sobered by the sight of the dead
and the agonies of the wounded. The Confederates retreated to
Johnson's ranch. From there they sent a party under a Hag of truce
to remove their dead and wounded from the battlefield.
The next day, because there was not enough water for their
horses at Pigeon's, Chivington's force went back to Kozlowski's
ranch. Here they found Slough and the rest of the Federal force,
who had hurried forward when they got word of the fighting. After
being apprised of the situation, Slough formed his plan of action.
Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Chavez, 25 one of the few native New
Mexicans who had not deserted or been sent home as useless, had
offered to guide a force over the mountains to the Confederate rear
at Johnson's ranch. Slough accepted the offer and decided on a
pincers movement. The next morning about four hundred infantrymen, commanded by Major Chivington and guided by Chavez,
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set out into the mountains south of Glorieta Pass. Slough and the
rest of the command, about eight hundred fifty men, continued
on down the Santa Fe Trail with the intention of engaging the
Confederates at Johnson's ranch until their comrades could attack
them from the rear.
They reached Pigeon's ranch about ten o'clock and stopped for
a rest. Some of the men visited friends wounded in the fighting
two days before who had been left at the ranch; others filled their
canteens, and others just lounged around. Suddenly pickets hurried in with the news that the Confederates were in the trees half
a mile ahead. Bugles blared and men scrambled to find their weapons and fall in. The ranks had barely been formed when the roar
of rebel artillery echoed through the mountains.
After the skirmish in Apache Canyon, Pyron had sent for help,
and the rest of the Confederate forces in the area, about seven hundred men under Colonel William R. Scurry 26 had hurried to his
aid. Scurry had placed his men in a strong natural position in the
canyon at Johnson's ranch. Then he waited throughout March 27
for the expected Federal appearance. The enemy failed to show up,
and on the morning of the 28th he started through the canyon to
find them. Scouts soon brought word that the Federal army was
halted at Pigeon's ranch, about half a mile ahead. The horses were
sent to the rear, the men were deployed, and the three artillery
pieces were ordered to open fire on the Federal skirmishers who
now began to appear about a quarter of a mile in front of the ranch.
Shortly after that the Confederate infantry moved forward. The
Federal forces, with the cavalry dismounted, advanced from the
ranch to meet them, and the eight Yankee field pieces began a brisk
return of the rebel fire. The crackle of small arms fire mingled with
the guttural roar of the artillery, and the engagement became general.
One Colorado company made its way in a ditch to the Confederate left Rank. From there they planned to assault the Rank
and capture the Confederate guns. Scurry, however, had seen the
danger; a force armed with pistols and bowie knives ran to the
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ditch under heavy fire and threw themselves in on top of the
startled Federals, who were driven back to their own lines after a
sharp struggle.
Now the Confederates launched an assault. The Coloradoans
recoiled and fell back to the ranch, and there was a lull in the
fighting. The Confederate cannons, as at Valverde, were smaller
than the Federal and again outnumbered. Although several of the
Confederate gunners had sacrificed themselves in an attempt to
keep their weapons in action, after all their officers had been struck
down and one of the guns had been demolished by a direct hit, they
withdrew from the field. At this point Scurry called them back
with instructions to probe the Federal lines by fire: there was an
adobe wall in front of the ranch buildings, and a rocky outcropping
behind them, and Scurry wanted to find out where the Yankees
had established their new line. This phase of the battle was marked
by sniping and maneuvering in the trees and rocks around the
ranch, and was what Colonel Slough called fighting "of the bushwacking kind."
After Scurry determined to his satisfaction that most of the
enemy were on the rocky ledge behind the house, he organized
another attack. The men were exhorted to capture the Federal guns
as they had at Valverde, then they moved forward. "Soon they appeared in front," recalled a Federal private who fought in the battle, "encouraged and shouted on by as brave officers as live; some
in squads, other [sic] singly, taking advantage of the timber as
much as possible in their approach." 27 They were within fifty yards
of the Northern lines when the Federal artillery, which had remained silent since the beginning of the attack, opened up; the
gunners continued to load and fire with lightning precision, and
the attackers were hurled back. They reorganized and moved in
again, only to find that the Federals, leaving a few dead and
wounded behind, had moved back to a new position. The battle
had lasted a good part of the day, and it was nearly four o'clock.
The Confederates now launched their supreme effort. They
charged the new Federal position, as one of their officers wrote,
"inspired with the unalterable determination to overcome every
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obstacle to the attainment of their object," 28 and this time succeeded in reaching the Federal guns. The supporting infantry
rushed forward to save their artillery, and "Inch by inch was the
ground disputed." 29 Finally, after the artillery had gotten safely ·
away, the Denver miners retreated, and the Texas frontiersmen,
who were too exhausted to pursue them, were left masters of the
field.
But while the Texans had been winning the battle, they had
been losing the campaign. They had left their supply train at
Johnson's ranch. Chivington's command had descended from the
mountains, easily overcome the small guard of cooks, wagoners,
and the sick, and burned all sixty-four wagons. The only Northern
casualty had been a man wounded when an ammunition wagon
exploded. This foray, as one Coloradoan wrote, "pierced [the Confederates] to their vitals, and drew from thence the life blood." 30
Most of the Confederate food, clothing, medical supplies, and
ammunition was destroyed, and they found themselves destitute,
a thousand miles from their home base, in hostile territory which
had been stripped bare by Indians.
Chivington learned about the battle at the other end of the pass
from captured Coloradoans who had been sent to the rear. Instead
of moving through the pass, the raiders again took to the moun- .
tains, apparently because Chivington believed that Confederate
reinforcements were approaching from Galisteo and did not want
to be trapped within the rocky walls. About midnight they reached
Kozlowski's ranch where the rest of the Federal force had established themselves after the retreat.
A truce had been agreed upon, and the next morning a Federal
party returned to the battlefield and buried their dead. When they
were finished they loaned their shovels to the Confederates. Years
later when the bodies were exhumed and moved to the national
cemetery in Santa Fe, there was no way to tell who had fought for
the North and who had fought for the South. Reports of casualty
figures vary, but a good estimate is that the North suffered 46
killed, 64 wounded, and 21 prisoners; Confederate losses were
probably about 36 killed, 6o wounded, and 25 captured.
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After the battle the Confederates had less than ten rounds
apiece. That night their meal consisted of what corn they could
find scattered in Pigeon's corral, and they slept without blankets.
The next day, after burying their dead, they withdrew to Santa
Fe. Sibley arrived from Albuquerque; a council of war was held,
and the officers decided that without supplies their position was
untenable. Soon the Confederate Army of New Mexico was retreating down the Rio Grande toward Texas.
The First Colorado, in obedience to a dispatch from Colonel
Canby at Fort Craig, had retraced their footsteps to Fort Union,
where another dispatch arrived ordering them to march south immediately. Canby, in order to reinforce the Federal forces in the
north and because supplies were running low at Fort Craig, had
started up the Rio Grande with about a thousand men, leaving
Colonel Kit Carson and several companies of New Mexico Volunteers in charge of the fort. En route he learned of the battle at
Glorieta Pass and the destruction of the Confederate train, and
sent an order countermanding his first one. When Canby arrived
at Albuquerque there was an artillery skirmish with the Confederate garrison; then he withdrew to Tijeras Canyon to wait for the
First Colorado. The next day the main Confederate army arrived
at Albuquerque with the Coloradoans not far behind. Because
most of the ammunition was gone, Sibley buried part of his artillery31 and continued down the river. The First Colorado joined
Canby and the combined Federal forces continued the pursuit.
There was a skirmish when the Confederates crossed to the west
bank of the Rio Grande at Peralta; then for two days the armies
marched within sight of each other on either bank of the river.
Near La Joya the Confederates abandoned their remaining baggage, and, leaving their fires burning, slipped away under the
cover of darkness into the San Mateo mountains. Here the once
proud Texas army, starving, thirsty, and sick with smallpox and
pneumonia, toiled on bleeding feet to drag their cannon over the
mountains while the Apache hovered about them like ghosts waiting to scalp the stragglers. Over half of the original Confederate
force left their bones in New Mexico. 32
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Robert E. Lee had ordered reinforcements and all available supplies sent to Sibley; 33 while, at Fort Riley, Kansas, five thousand
Federal soldiers were being outfitted for service in New Mexico. 34
After reaching Texas, Sibley wrote his superiors that it was impossible to campaign in New Mexico, and that his troops had "manifested a dogged, irreconcilable detestation of the country and the
people." 35 He implied that they would refuse to return. For all
practical purposes the Civil War in New Mexico was over.
Had the Confederates been in a more prosperous and friendly
country, they might have been able to recoup their fortunes after
Glorieta Pass. Under the circumstances, Chivington's raid was the
coup de grace for the Confederate version of manifest destiny with
its gold fields and outlet on the Pacific. Had the Confederates won
the battle it might not have guaranteed them success, but it would
probably have meant the opening of a third great theater of Civil
War operations, and the battle of Glorieta Pass would be more
familiar to Americans than it is today.
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NOTES
I. Latham Anderson, "Canby's Services in the New Mexico Campaign," Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2 (New York, I887), p. 698.
2. Paul Horgan, Great River: The Rio Grande in North American
History, vol. 2 (New York, I954), p. 823.
3· Anderson, vol. 2, p. 698. Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of California, vol. 7 (San Francisco, I89o), p. 284, says insurance rates on mail
steamers carrying California gold rose until insurance was suspended. At
one point in the war, Washington ordered gold shipments stopped for fear
they would be intercepted by rebel cruisers.
4- Martin Hardwick Hall, Sibley's New Mexico Campaign (Austin,
I96o), pp. 36-38 says there were about 2,700 Texans after the first muster,
but implies that more recruits were accepted later. On p. 77 an estimate of
3,ooo is given. Some estimates place the number of Texans at close to 3,7oo.
5· Sibley, a native of Louisiana, was a veteran of 23 years service. He
was the inventor of the Sibley tent and stove, both of which were adopted
by the U.S. Army. After the war he entered the service of the Khedive of
Egypt.
6. Loomis Morton Ganaway, "New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy," NMHR, vol. I8 (I943), p. 238.
7· Charles S. Walker, "Causes of the Confederate Invasion of New
Mexico," NMHR, vol. 8 (I933), p. 86.
8. Ralph Emerson Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Mexican
History, vol. 2 (Albuquerque, I963), p. 369.
9· All the Texans were originally mounted, and trained as both infantry and cavalry. There were two companies of lancers, who, after Valverde,
discarded that weapon and added shoulder weapons taken from Northern
dead to their pistols. By the time the Texans reached Albuquerque, hardship and Indians had taken such a toll of the horses that a third of the Confederate Army of New Mexico was formed into a regiment of infantry.
Io. Col. Thomas Green, "Engagement at Valverde, N. Mex.," Confederate Victories in the Southwest; Prelude to Defeat; From the Official
Records, ed. by Calvin P. Horn and William S. Wallace (Albuquerque,
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